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21. Introduction
The present UK government has adopted a New Localism in the operation of
regional policy (Balls, 2002). This involves the delegation of discretionary powers to
locally elected bodies, such as the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly, and a
host of devolved agencies, such as the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs). We
fear that because of standard asymmetric information problems, such policies will be
extremely difficult to evaluate, which has implications for both their efficiency and
democratic accountability.
However, even without these particular extended principal agent problems, the
effectiveness of regional policy is hard to measure. We illustrate this by discussing the
issues raised in evaluating and appraising more conventional policies. In our approach
we aim to be complementary with more practical surveys of regional policy
evaluation (Taylor, 2002). We argue that evaluation raises issues of allocation, co-
ordination, information and motivation. The optimal policy is difficult to identify,
even with a very simple policy framework, because some of the outcomes are
necessarily qualitative and others are conflicting. We hope that this discussion will be
used to lay the ground for a more focussed future examination of the evaluation issues
raised by the present and proposed regional policy framework.
Section 2 considers the classic welfare approach to regional policy evaluation in
which the policy problem involves constrained maximisation. In Section 3, the
general strengths and weaknesses of this approach are discussed. Section 4 presents
policy evaluation as though it were a control engineering problem. This is what is
implied in taking the standard welfare approach. Sections 5 and 6 explore the
implications of introducing informational problems. Section 5 investigates the
identification of the Social Welfare Function and Section 6 the identification of the
true model of the economy. In Section 7 we consider how uncertainty in these two
areas can interact to further complicate and confuse policy evaluation. Section 8
explores attempts to evaluate without theory. We see no way out along this route.
Section 9 is a short conclusion. 
32. The Classic Welfare Approach to Regional Policy Evaluation
The standard welfare economics approach to policy evaluation and appraisal
comprises five elements. First the evaluation must identify the key policy instruments,
p, and exogenous non-policy variables, n. By policy instruments we mean any
variable under the direct influence of the government or government agencies. This
could include the provision of infrastructure, services and advice; setting tax and
subsidy rates; and the imposition of physical and financial controls. Exogenous non-
policy variables would typically include economic variables such as foreign demand
for the economys exports, and physical factors such as the incidence of natural
disasters. 
Second, the vector of policy-relevant endogenous target variables, q, needs to be
selected. In principle, all endogenous variables in the economy will be affected by a
change in one or more exogenous policy variables. However, for practical purposes a
limited set of target variables needs to be chosen. There are two theoretical reasons
why a variable might be excluded from those identified in vector q: the impact on the
variable might be very small or the variable might have no welfare significance.
Examples of the kind of variable that might be included amongst the target variables
for regional policy would be employment and output for individual regions.
Of course, in so far as the operation of regional policy significantly affects more
general policy areas, such as, for example, national output, the level of inflation and
environmental indicators, these should also be included in the vector of target
variables. This is an element of what the present government refers to as joined-up
policy.
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 Also, in practice the choice of target variables has to take into account the
requirement for accurate and timely measurement. 
 Third, the evaluation then requires a theory that links the target variables to the
policy instruments and non-policy variables. This can be represented as:
q q p n ( , ) (1)
We are thinking of theory here as a mechanism for understanding the causal
relationships between policy instruments and target variables. Equation (1) should be
4understood to incorporate behavioural relationships and, where appropriate,
macroeconomic constraints. Equation (1) should therefore be seen as the
representation of the overall economic constraint within which regional policy
operates.    
Fourth, evaluation generally entails numerical precision. Not only the qualitative
changes in target variables, but also quantitative measurements of the size of such
changes are normally required. Therefore knowledge of the appropriate functional
form and key parameter values is necessary. Assuming that this function is
differentiable, the change in the ith policy relevant variable, dqi, resulting from a












Finally a Social Welfare Function - less formally, a set of evaluation weights  is
required to judge whether changes to the economy generated by the application of
policy have brought about a net benefit. The Social Welfare Function is simply a
mechanism for ranking different economic states. 
SWF S n q S n q p n  ( , ) ( , ( , )) (3)
The standard cost-benefit procedure is an example (Schofield, 1987; Swales, 1997). 
If we have perfect knowledge about the exact form of expressions (1) and (3), the
nature of the criteria that should be used for ex ante appraisal and ex post evaluation is
relatively straightforward. Again, assuming the functions are differentiable, the ex
ante acceptance criterion for a policy package that changes each element j of the
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where n
e
 is the expected value of the exogenous, non-policy variables.
Although expression (4) looks a little daunting, it is easily unravelled. The first
bracketed term inside the double sigma signs expresses the rate of change of social
5welfare with respect to target variable qi. It measures the relative marginal weight of
variable qi in the Social Welfare Function. The second bracketed term is the rate of
change of the target variable qi with respect to the policy variable pj. Equation (4)
therefore simply identifies the net effect on the vector of target variables, dq, of the
policy package, dp, and then values these changes using marginal weights from the
Social Welfare Function.
Equation (4) can similarly be used for ex post policy evaluation by replacing
the expected values of the non-policy variables, n
e
, by their actual values, n. Again a
positive value for the expression in equation (4) indicates that the policy generated an
increase in welfare. Note that if the target variables are defined such that they enter
the Social Welfare Function with a positive marginal weight, then policy must at least
have the possibility of generating negative effects on some target variables. If not, ex
ante appraisals and ex post evaluations of these sorts are trivial exercises.
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It is a short step from appraising policy proposals to identifying the optimal
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This is the welfare maximising policy as long as the appropriate second order
conditions hold (Chiang, 1974, ch. 11). Equation (5) simply states that the jth policy
variable should be increased until its marginal impact on social welfare is zero. This
marginal impact is calculated by multiplying the impact on each target variable by the
marginal weights supplied by the Social Welfare Function. 
3. General Strengths and Weaknesses of the Conventional Evaluation Approach
The major strength of this conventional approach to economic evaluation is
the clear separation of the economic constraints (equation 1) and the policy objectives
- the Social Welfare Function (equation 3). This separation is useful both conceptually
and practically. Conceptually, the policy choice can be set up as a constrained
optimising problem, a type of challenge economists are well equipped to tackle.
Practically, it is beneficial to separately identify the two very different broad
6influences on policy choice. That is to say, this approach distinguishes between the
objectives of policy, which reflect citizens preferences and are articulated through the
political process, and the economic relationships between the key variables, which are
determined by physical laws, factor supplies and those ruling institutional
arrangements outwith governments control. Moreover, the optimising decision draws
attention to the importance of marginal trade-offs both in production and the Social
Welfare Function. It provides a conceptually rich analysis in contrast to the one-
dimensional pledges and targets approach currently favoured by the present
government.
However, the weakness in the analysis portrayed in Section 2 is that it implies
perfect knowledge about policy objectives and the way in which policy operates. That
is to say, the specific forms of equations (1) and (3) are assumed to be common
knowledge, at least amongst the evaluation community. Where this is the case, the
aim of evaluation is to improve co-operation and co-ordination amongst the
government and other economic agents in improving allocation. But our contention is
that regional policy evaluation has very different aims. In point of fact, the UK
government has never identified the objectives of regional policy very clearly and
certainly not the marginal policy weights. Also there is much disagreement
concerning the operation of the UK economy, and a fortiori the operation of
economic policy, across space. These informational deficiencies transform the nature
of the evaluation process and this is explored in the remainder of the paper. Not
surprisingly, information generation, revelation and motivational issues feature
strongly. 
 
4. Evaluation as a Control Engineering Problem
With perfect information, appraisal, evaluation and optimal policy choice
become purely technical problems, almost akin to those in control engineering (Dixit,
1996; Stiglitz, 2002). However, this is not the typical perception of economic
evaluation in general, and certainly regional policy evaluation in particular. With
perfect information, evaluation would be denoted by the loop shown in Figure 1. In
this diagram, information is represented by dotted lines, actions by hard lines and
signals by double lines.
7In Box 1 we have the citizens (C). Box 2 identifies the Social Welfare
Function (SWF), which is taken to be a true representation of citizens preferences
over different economic states. Box 3 introduces the government (G), which acts as
the citizens agent and attempts to maximise this social welfare through policy
intervention.  Box 4 gives the chosen values for policy variables and Box 5 the levels
of the exogenous non-policy variables. Box 6 represents the true relationship between
the policy and non-policy variables and the target variables. Box 7 is the resulting
values for the target variables. Box 8 contains the appraiser/evaluator (A).
The function of appraiser is to collect information and then send a signal to the
government. The information concerns: the SWF, from Box 2, the exogenous non-
policy and policy variables, Boxes 4 and 5, the economic constraints, Box 6, and the
outcome for the target variables, Box 7. The signals could be either or both
suggestions for future policy (ex ante appraisal) or judgements over past policy (ex
post evaluation). 
From Figure 1 a number of key points can be made concerning the role of the
evaluator. The first is that with perfect information, her main function would be in ex
ante appraisal, rather than ex post evaluation. Two main skills are involved. The first
is judgement concerning the expected future (or, with reporting lags, present) values
of the non-policy variables. This judgement would be made using the information
coming from Box 5. The second is undertaking the maximising calculations. The
information relating to the effectiveness of past decisions, the conventional ex post
evaluations, would only be a check. It would be one, but not generally the only,
information source concerning the relationship in Box 7.

















In this scenario the evaluator has, as Dixit and Stiglitz separately correctly
maintain, essentially an engineering control role. The evaluator acts in a way similar to a
forward-looking thermostat that sets radiator controls in response to estimated present
and expected future outside temperatures. The position of the evaluator in Figure 1 has
many similarities to the operation of the UK Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). This
committee sends a signal to the Bank of England every month concerning changes in the
interest rate policy to maintain inflation levels within a target band. It is very much
concerned with ex ante appraisal, is operating to a well defined Social Welfare Function
concerning inflation and with a well researched theory linking inflation to interest rates.
However, the operation of the MPC is unusual amongst government policy evaluation
and certainly differs markedly from regional policy evaluation.
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From the perspective of Figure 1, there is no necessity for the evaluator to be
separate from the government. Economies of specialisation might favour the government
outsourcing this service, but in principle it could be done by civil servants. Moreover,
Figure 1 implies that there are no motivational problems: governments operate solely in
the interests of the citizens and the appraiser acts diligently and truthfully. Similarly, with
perfect information evaluation merges into policy formulation, as reference to the
Monetary Policy Committee suggests. Although ex ante appraisal is usually conceived as
a process whereby the evaluator appraises individual policy schemes submitted by the
government, with a well-defined SWF and set of constraints, the evaluator could be given
the job of choosing the optimal policy. Finally, with the perfect information scenario,
there is no reason for the evaluations to be public knowledge, but again there is no reason
for them not to be.
5
5. Evaluation as an Information Problem: The Social Welfare Function 
What is rather curious about the process outlined in Table 1 is that although the
central aim of policy evaluation is the revelation of information, there is assumed to be no
conflicts of interest involved. All agents act truthfully and diligently and fully reveal what
they know. Perhaps with perfect information, everyone is a potential evaluator so that
10
there is no possible gain in attempting to distort or withhold information. However, we
know that where information is costly to gather and/or process, and in particular where
there is asymmetric access to information, co-ordination and motivational problems are
likely to arise. What is implied here is that it is in the interests of some (or all) individuals
and groups to withhold or distort information in their own interests. 
As stated in Section 3, in practice two major informational issues beset regional
policy evaluation. These are illustrated in Figure 2, which amends the representation of
the evaluation process given in Figure 1. It illustrates the evaluation process with
incomplete information. One issue concerns the agency problems surrounding the
identification of the Social Welfare Function. This is represented in Box A, which
incorporates Boxes 1 and 2 for the citizen and the government. The other is the
competing set of weakly parameterised theories in Box 6. Further, these informational
difficulties interact in the evaluation process. 
We begin with the specification of the Social Welfare Function. Since the
inception of UK regional policy, governments of all political persuasions have been very
vague in spelling out their policy goals and particularly the weights attached to the
individual elements making up their regional policy objectives. In practice, for regional
policy evaluation, only the most crude target variables are usually identified - in the past,
net regional employment generated and net exchequer costs incurred have been the most
popular  with no marginal trade off rates explicitly specified. More recently, the Public
Service Agreement targets for regional policy over the period 2003-2006 were to
[m]ake sustainable improvements in the economic performance of all English
regions and over the long term reduce the persistent gap in growth rates between
regions, defining measures to improve performance and reporting progress against
these measures by 2006 (HM Treasury, 2002, p. 25)
6
.
The Social Welfare Function is supposed to drive appraisal and evaluation. Why is the
government so reticent in revealing the Social Welfare Function and what are the
implications for evaluation? 
















































The first point to be recognised is that in Figure 2 we have removed the fiction
that the citizens have a self-evident Social Welfare Function that the government simply
attempts to maximise. Rather, we take it that one of the functions of the government is to
articulate such a welfare function. That is to say, in the implicitly democratic account
outlined in Figure 2 the citizens elect the government, partially based upon promises
concerning policies that they will carry out, and the government then sets about
implementing a SWF of its choice. The day-to-day political process implies that
information will flow from citizens, or representatives of particular groups, to the
government and from the government to the citizens. That is to say, in Box A we present
a stylised depiction of the political process.
The position of the government involves at least three potentially troublesome
informational aspects. The first is that formally the government acts as the agent to the
principal, the electorate, and one of its functions is to organise the provision and
financing of public goods, which includes the operation of appropriate economic
policies.
7
 There are standard moral hazard problems associated with this role, involving
both potential hidden actions and hidden information available to the government. The
operation of the government clearly need some monitoring and, at the bottom line,
evaluation has a role in countering government corruption and fraud (Rose-Ackerman,
1999).
However, the evaluation process clearly has a more general potential impact on
the likelihood of the governments being re-elected. Whilst governments praise the
bracing effects of evaluation for others (teachers, doctors etc.), it is not necessarily
unreasonable that they should attempt to evade evaluation themselves. One argument is
that if the governments objective function, their Social Welfare Function, were to be
known too precisely, then their performance might be too straightforwardly identified.
Perhaps governments see an advantage in selectively releasing information ex post -
showcasing good news and burying bad news  rather than setting up a measuring rod ex
ante against which their performance can be measured.
13
There is a major problem with this approach: propaganda is not an effective
communication strategy. The notion that citizens will believe available reports on the
effectiveness of government policies to be unbiased whilst these reports have in fact been
selectively doctored so as to screen out negative elements and highlight positive ones is
not credible. And once citizens begin to question the objectivity of the available evidence
on government performance, then even genuine good news is undermined. This is the
problem facing the present Labour government concerning so-called spin.
It seems to us that the argument that the government will fail to make clear its
Social Welfare Function in order to shield itself from adverse criticism is not a strong
one. It is important for the credibility of a particular government that it should be subject
to searching scrutiny by independent institutions such as the press and academia. Whilst
there might be persistent short-run temptation to massage evidence on policy impacts,
such behaviour damages long-term credibility. This having been said, political decisions
do often seem to be driven by short-term considerations and perhaps governments are
only just realising the corrosive long-run effect of excessive information manipulation. 
However, a second, rather different, issue follows from the governments position
as agent to the electorate. This is that the government is not serving a single principal but
rather multiple principals. But it is well known that where these principals differ in their
interests, it might be impossible to identify a single Social Welfare Function within a
democratic setting (Arrow, 1963). Faced with this problem but a necessity to act, it might
be the optimal strategy for a government trying to build a majority for a particular policy
to keep the aims of the policy vague. This might be particularly important for spatial
policy where it is likely that there would be spatial losers as well as winners following
any particular policy and where these spatial groups will be relatively easy to organise
and activate.
8
   
Whilst the government can be seen as the agent of the electorate, in many
situations - when it directs policy - it will also act as the principal. In these circumstances
private sector organisations - firms or unions for example - might take the role of agents
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in the delivery of policy goals. However, for successful co-ordination, it might be
important that the governments type (its specific preferences) be known only
imprecisely. For example, in cheap talk games players can choose more effective
strategies if they know one anothers type. However, unless they have perfectly aligned
preferences, there is no equilibrium disclosure of information if each is forced to reply
with total precision (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Farrell and Rabin, 1996). It is in the
interests of each to attempt to mislead the other player. But because the other player
knows this, this misrepresentation is taken into account. But the first player can anticipate
this so that escalation in information distortion occurs with no final equilibrium.
However, if each player has only to identify their type imprecisely, within a wider group,
an equilibrium is potentially possible with some information passing between players.
Similarly, in the bilateral trading problem with agents of different types, Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983) show that exchange will not take place if, and only if, it is efficient.
Essentially, it is not incentive-compatible for either agent to be honest about their type.
This equally applies in cases where one of the agents is the government. 
An example from regional policy might be the refusal by the Treasury to identify
a precise shadow wage for regional employment. If this were known, it could weaken the
governments position in negotiations over combined actions with unions or firms, so that
it would be in the governments interest to misrepresent its true value for the shadow
wage or present the information in a very vague form.
The discussion over the identification of the Social Welfare Function raises two
key issues concerning the role of evaluation. The first relates to the potential disjuncture
between the government and the electorate. In Figure 1 we imply that the interests of
citizens straightforwardly translate into a well-defined Social Welfare Function. The
government then attempts to undertake policies that will improve the position of its
citizens through increasing their welfare. However, in Figure 2 we introduce two ideas
that question this. First, citizens almost certainly have interests that differ one with
another, so that the determination of the Social Welfare Function becomes problematic.
Second, members of the government are likely to have interests that differ from the
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electorate as a whole. Therefore, it is likely that to counter moral hazard problems, the
government needs to be monitored.
From these perspectives the role of policy evaluation is to increase the
information available to the electorate. This information concerns both the nature of the
operation of particular policies and the diligence of the government in pursuing these
policies. These facts should improve the democratic process in that they give the
electorate more information that can be used to more effectively choose between different
policies and different governments (Stiglitz, 1999). Also, the fact that its policies are
being monitored should also increase the effort that any incumbent government puts in to
policy delivery. Essentially this implies that in democratic countries, evaluation should
play a role in the democratic process  the process of the policy choice and scrutiny of
the government. However, how central to the role of evaluation should these
considerations be? Who is the evaluation for and how widely should the results be
distributed? 
The second key issue is that there might be conflict between the effectiveness of
policy and the rigour of the evaluation. We have argued that the effectiveness of policy
might rely on the governments objectives being rather opaque whereas the effectiveness
of the policy evaluation depends on their being transparent. Here there is a tension
between the role of policy evaluation in increasing government accountability and its role
in improving direct government efficiency. 
We do not have a watertight argument with which to navigate these difficult
waters; we present here no all-encompassing model whereby these competing roles for
evaluation are traded off or somehow rendered compatible. However, our own instincts
follow those of Stiglitz (2002, p. 488) who writes: Without unbiased information, the
check that can be provided by the citizenry [on the behaviour of the government] is
limited; without good information, the contestability of the political process can be
undermined. It is therefore of concern when the government attempts to control the
research agenda for academics, implicitly asserts that its own perception of policy
16
concerns are necessarily those of the population as a whole and finances evaluation
reports that are not freely available to the public.
. 
6. Evaluation as an Information Problem: The Link between Policy Instruments and
Target Variables
 In the conventional, perfect information, account of evaluation, as represented by
Figure 1, we know precisely the link between the vectors of policy instruments, non-
policy variables and the target variables. However, in practice in the UK there is no
consensus over the appropriate theory that underpins the operation of regional policy and
certainly no agreed precisely parameterised model. Part of the evaluation process
therefore becomes necessarily bound up with model choice and hypothesis testing.
One reason why there is disagreement over the underlying economic processes
causing variation in activity over space might simply be the complexity of the
phenomena. This would particularly apply to analyses that focus on a regions
development as the qualitative evolution of economic activity over time. Testing such
theories might simply be inherently difficult. However, a key element in the uncertainty
surrounding the true nature of spatial economic processes within the UK is the lack of
regional data. 
It will be useful to focus on data problems with measures that potentially make up
the policy-relevant endogenous target variables, q, and the exogenous non-policy
variables, n. For most of the relevant regional variables, measures are imprecise. That is
to say, the true accuracy is unknown.   For some variables that we would expect to be in
the n set, estimates are simply not available. We begin by taking the example of the
regional policy regime of 1960s and 1970s.
In the accepted policy impact model used to evaluate regional policies in this
period, the main target variable was employment. In practice, operational definitions, and
accurate measures, of regional employment are needed. These would include both
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employees and self-employment and would, at a minimum, allow distinctions between
part-time and full-time jobs. Reasonably robust estimates of employee jobs are available
for UK regions. However, there are more substantial problems with the self-employment
data and information on employment status, etc.
 These problems are magnified in the context of newer policy regimes that take
productivity measures as target variables. HM Treasurys preferred productivity measure
is GDP per hour. Data issues are here much more serious, given that there are problems
in estimating both the numerator (regional GDP) and denominator (regional employment)
in productivity measures.
The process of estimating GDP at the national level is highly complex and is
likely to generate various types of errors, so that the final accuracy of these estimates is
problematic (Akritidis, 2002). Since the accuracy is unknown, it is difficult to judge
whether changes in estimated GDP reflect real economic events or variations in the
estimation process. These problems are much more severe for regional estimates. This is
due to a number of factors. First, smaller sample sizes in the main survey sources
increases sampling errors, particularly for the smaller regions. Second, modelling is used
to regionalize results from national surveys that are not stratified at a regional level.
Third, for the regional data we lack the triangulation checks between the product,
expenditure and income estimation methods. GDP estimates for UK regions use only the
income approach (Lacey, 2000).   
ONS have not provided an assessment of accuracy for UK regional accounts since
1990 (ONS, 1990).   Recent statements merely comment that the overall margin of error
of the estimates  is very difficult to judge (Lacey, 2000). Data accuracy is likely to be
substantially less with regional than with national estimates due to additional inaccuracies
generated by the process of allocating national estimates by region. These errors might
entail systematic biases as well as a mere lack of precision, with potentially serious
policy implications (Cameron and Muellbauer, 2000).
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As we have already commented, there are also errors in the denominator of
productivity measures, employment. This generates additional uncertainty concerning the
accuracy of the resulting productivity measures, since errors in the numerator and
denominator can interact in complex ways. The result is that we have fairly poor
information, even on the target variables for regional policy. There is concern that these
data might not be sufficiently precise to allow identification of impacts from feasible
regional policy interventions. that is to say, the margin of error is likely to be large in
comparison with realistic policy impacts.
Data problems also extend to non-policy variables within the impact model.
Take again a simple demand-driven impact model with an employment target. Policy
impact depends on intra- and inter-regional Input-Output (I-O) linkages, etc. The nature
of these linkages is poorly understood for most UK regions, due to a lack of regional I-O
accounts. For example, a key characteristic of regional, as against national, economies is
that they are very open - regions typically trade heavily with other regions. However, in
the UK, apart from Scotland, there are no official regional trade data. Further, the
openness of the region makes price competitiveness an important issue. However, there is
a complete lack of regional price data. Again, a stylised fact concerning regional
economies is that factor mobility between regions is much higher than between nations.
But the UK has very limited information about regional migration and capital stock. The
overall effect of this lack of regional data is to seriously limit scope for testing alternative
theories of the determinants of regional economic activity and accurately parameterising
such models. 
The lack of an agreed theoretical framework has two important implications for
evaluation. First, any empirical work on regional data potentially benefits appraisal and
evaluation performance if it improves information about the operation of regional
economies. Second, ex post evaluation should be closely linked to the hypothesis testing
literature. In fact policy changes should provide relevant exogenous shocks that can be
used to reveal the comparative static properties of the regional economy.
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This is in contrast to the view that evaluation involves a choice from a cookbook
of methods where the particular context suggests the most appropriate technique. For an
economist, the approach of researchers such as Ashcroft and Taylor (1979), Harris
(1991), Moore et al (1986) and Wren and Waterson (1991) has much to recommend it.
9
Using this method, the evaluation jointly tests the policy effectiveness hypotheses
together with other hypotheses about the operation of the regional economy. Our main
criticisms of this kind of work are simply that not enough has been done and sometimes
too much emphasis is placed on identifying policy effects and insufficient in attempting
to interpret the results concerning other elements of the regional economy. 
It is of interest to compare this kind of analysis with the industrial survey
approach that accompanied the shift towards discretionary policy in the 1980s (PACEC,
1993). This is evaluation based upon interview and questionnaire surveys of recipient
firms. The impacts of policy are identified under three headings: additionality,
displacement and multiplier effects. In practice, this type of evaluation focuses on the
measurement of additionality. This is the accuracy with which civil servants can identify
marginal projects; projects that would not have gone ahead without aid. The
measurement of displacement only attempts to take into account product market effects,
and the impact is asserted not tested. No labour market displacement is typically
identified at the regional level. Further, multiplier effects are often determined by
applying simple rules of thumb. Importantly, these evaluations provide few insights into
how regional economies operate or how regional policy actually effects the relationship
between regional aggregates.
A number of useful points can be made about the implications for policy
evaluation of the underdeveloped state of empirical regional models in the UK. The first
is that regional policy evaluation will improve with any improvement in our empirical
knowledge of the operation of the UK economy over space. Such improvements might
come from work that is not directly policy orientated. Second, where evaluation methods
imply or impose a particular untested model, then this should be made explicit. Third,
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that evaluation itself should attempt to improve our understanding of the economic
processes that operate within and across regions.  
7. Interaction between the Uncertainties Concerning the SWF and the Appropriate
Empirical Model
The uncertainty in one part of the evaluation process can interact with uncertainty
in other parts. For example, uncertainty over the true model of the economy permits
uncertainty over the SWF. If the relationship between policy instruments and target
variables were common knowledge, it would be difficult for the government to conceal
the marginal weights in its SWF. A government maximising its SWF will equate the
marginal rate of transformation between target variables in the economy with the
marginal rate of substitution in the SWF. Under these circumstances, a correct model of
the economy, together with optimising behaviour by the government, will reveal the
marginal weights that enter the SWF. However, uncertainty over the appropriate
empirical model for the economy allows the government to be vague over the implicit
marginal weights in its SWF.
A rather more concrete example of interaction can occur if a particular empirical
model from Box 6 in Figure 2 is specified for use in an evaluation. As will be argued at
greater length in the next section, the characteristics of the specific model used in
evaluation might well affect whether a particular policy initiative will be identified as
efficient or not. Under these circumstances the government or a pressure group might
attempt to impose a particular (hidden) SWF through the choice of the evaluation model
to be used. 
A regional authority or pressure group, whose SWF will give greater weight to
activity in its own region, might attempt to influence the national government by
employing such an approach. Imagine an economy in which there are two regions, North,
N, and South, S. Also assume that only employment, e, enters the governments or
regional authoritys SWF and that these are given as:
21
SWF e eG N S ln ln (6)
SWF eN N (7)
where subscript G stands for government and subscripts N and S for the corresponding
region.
 Equation (6) represents the governments SWF. This is increasing in employment
in each region and, for a given national employment level, favours a more equal regional
distribution of employment. Equation (7) is the SWF for the Northern regional authority.
This is simply increasing in Northern employment and disregards (gives a zero weight to)
the employment level in the South. 
Imagine that a particular policy change ('p) generates a change in the target
variables ('q), whose true value, represented by the T superscript, in this case is given by
['eTN, -'eTS]. What is implied here is that employment increases in the North are
accompanied by employment decreases in the South. Using the governments SWF, the
efficiency of the policy is uncertain until the absolute size of the employment changes
and the initial employment levels in the two regions are known. However, under the
Northern regional authoritys SWF, the policy is unambiguously efficient.
Suppose that the Northern regional authority commissions an evaluation but
specifies that a model should be used which only identifies the impact on the Northern
region. Many regional impact models are of this type, as the spatially concentrated direct
impacts of regional policy can be easily identified but the spatially diffuse indirect
impacts are more difficult to quantify.
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 Imagine that the measured impacts on Northern
and Southern employment, 'eMN  and 'eMS are therefore given by:
' ' 'e e eNM NT SM  D , 0 (8)
where D > 0. This means that the change in measured Northern employment is positively
related to the true change in Northern employment and the measured change in Southern
employment is zero. 
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The key point here is that if the Northern regional authority can get the
government to accept this evaluation method, then the governments measured SWF
becomes observationally equivalent to Northern regional authoritys true SWF. The
change in the governments measured SWF, 'SWFMG, can be expressed as a function of
























Expression (9) means that whenever the change in the value of the true SWF for the
Northern regional authority is positive, the change in the governments measured SWF
will also be positive. Moreover, where two policies are to be compared, the ordering
using the governments measured SWF will be the same as that using the Northern
regional authorities true SWF.
This discussion implies that the distinction between the SWF and the economic
constraints can become blurred where there is uncertainty over the nature of these
functions. That is to say, disputes concerning which particular theory or method to adopt
in an evaluation might in fact be disputes over the appropriate SWF. That this notion is
not fanciful is supported by the Treasury directive that evaluations of regeneration policy
should take place under the assumption that no additional employment will be generated
in the economy as a whole (PACEC, 1993; HM Treasury, 1997). That is to say, the
Treasury evaluation rules impose:
' 'e eNM SM 
This rule counters the particular strategy outlined above, but if that is its role, it again
clouds the distinction between the economic constraints and the SWF: a judgement about
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the nature of the constraint is adopted in order to reduce argument fuelled by differences
over the nature of the SWF. 
8. Theory-lite Evaluation: Hillclimbing
One crucial truth implicit in the discussion up to now concerns the central role
played by theory in all aspects of the evaluation process. Theory directs us to look for
certain relationships and not others. It tells us that certain variables are fundamental,
others can be ignored. It supplies a causal narrative linking the policy instruments with
the target variables. These causal narratives allow us to understand how policy works and
to explain its operation to others. Where the theory that underlies evaluation is not stated,
it remains implicit.
 
Certain key elements in the evaluation process outlined in Section 2 - that is the
identification and parameterisation of the model for the relationship between policy
instruments and target variables  are clearly theory dependent. However, the particular
theoretical framework adopted will play a part in all of the elements that make up the
evaluation process.
The appropriate exogenous variables and what are taken to be effective policy
instruments will be affected by the chosen theoretical approach. For example, as argued
in the previous section, for regional evaluation at least, the Treasurys official position is
that the natural rate hypothesis operates at the national level. This implies that total UK
employment is exogenous to the operation of this form of policy (HM Treasury, 1997).
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Further, theory will direct us to the appropriate target variables and their weight in the
Social Welfare Function. The retro theoretical framework that identified regional
problems with failure in the labour market points to employment as a key target variable.
However, the recently adopted spatial-co-ordination-failure approach promotes regional
productivity as the key target variable (HM Treasury, 2001).
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To a certain extent there is a degree of circularity here. The availability of data is
likely to reflect the theoretical ideas current in the recent past. Where data collection is
costly, the government targets its information gathering activities to those that are
perceived to be particularly useful. This can limit the evaluation of policies driven by a
new theoretical agenda. An example is cluster policy, where the identification of cluster
performance is often problematic because data are not collected at the level of the cluster
but rather by outdated sectors (Learmonth et al, 2003). 
We have claimed that uncertainty about which theory to use for policy evaluation
is problematic. However, it is sometimes claimed that we can cut this particular Gordian
knot through the use of theory-lite evaluation techniques. These techniques are thought to
replicate, either directly or indirectly, the role of controlled experiments in the natural
sciences. One method is to try to get matched samples of companies. For example, one
sample of companies can be chosen which did, and another which did not, receive the
policy (Hill, 2001). The same approach could be applied to individuals, areas or some
other appropriate aggregation of policy recipients. There are at least two problems with
this method. The first is that it does not get around the problem of requiring a prior theory
because one needs to match the sample companies on some criteria and these criteria will
be theory specific. Second, it is difficult to identify such samples of firms in the normal
operation of policy: such an exercise would therefore have to be set up experimentally
(Taylor, 2002).
A second, at one time influential, approach that was claimed to be atheoretical
involves the use of the shift-share technique (Fothergill and Gudgin, 1979). The
underlying notion here is that shift-share removes the national effects operating through
the regions industrial structure, leaving only a region-specific residual. The method was
then further extended to remove other elements of regional structure (specifically its
spatial structure). In all of this, shift share was described explicitly as not being a theory
but merely a standardisation procedure. The problem with this claim is that shift-share
will only accurately identify the impacts of national effects working at the level of the
region if it accurately replicates those effects. In order to know that we need the true
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theory of how those effects work. Therefore shift-share cannot be seen as an atheoretical
technical device, and further its theoretical foundations are weak (Holden et al, 1989).     
A more radical response to the discussion up to now might be to question the need
for such intellectual rumination at all. There are many activities that seem conceptually
fraught with difficulty, such as learning to read or riding a bicycle, which are relatively
straightforward once attempted. Many practitioners might see evaluation in the form of a
control engineering solution, as identified in Figure 1, but implementing a backward-,
rather than forward-, looking policy-adjustment process. 
The form of evaluation suggested here is essentially a trial and error, iterative,
hill-climbing procedure. In this type of approach, the distinction between ex ante
appraisal and ex post evaluation is blurred. Policy becomes a repeating cycle whereby
future policy directions depend upon the perceived effectiveness of past policy initiatives
(Batterbury and Hill, 2003). Policies are used as long as they are producing positive
changes and adjusted when they are not. In the context of the devolved delivery of policy,
the efficiency of this trial and error procedure might be enhanced through benchmark
competition (Tirole, 1994). With devolution, the effectiveness of a number of policies
could be compared simultaneously.     
A number of points need to be made about such a general approach. The first is
that with this method policy goals need to be modest and policy instruments simple and
robust, rather than complex and sophisticated, if the government is operating with such a
lack of information. For example, the authorities need rapid feedback if individual
policies are ineffective. Policies that necessarily produce results over an extended time
period are less efficiently operated in this way.
Second, for the actual climbing of hills, the strategy has some major drawbacks -
this is the reason that ramblers purchase maps, guides and compasses. The method might
only lead to a local, rather than global optimum and might be achieved by a very
inefficient route. However, the hill walker has the advantage of knowing that any gain in
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height has occurred through her own actions: the physical characteristics of the hill are,
except under catastrophic conditions, fixed. But this cannot be said for the process of
regional policy evaluation, producing the well-known counter factual problem. To use
this method efficiently implies that we can accurately model the operation of the
economy without policy but cannot model the operation of the economy with policy. But,
as we have argued already, we have difficulty in modelling the regional economy, either
with or without policy intervention. 
A third problem is that a strategy of changing policy iteratively in response to
evidence on effectiveness generates problems of time consistency in the setting of policy
(Kydland and Prescott, 1977). Essentially, the government cannot credibly commit to
future policy actions, and this might seriously limit policy effectiveness. This is important
where investment decisions are to be taken by the private sector which depend on aid
levels in the future.
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9. Conclusions and Challenges for the Future
Four main conclusions can be drawn from the discussion in this paper. The first is
that all existing evaluation results for UK regional policy must be tentative, because of
the weakness of regional data and our lack of knowledge about the underlying spatial
economic model. Perhaps accompanying this conclusion should be the advice that policy
aims should therefore be relatively modest and the temptation to micro-manage regional
policy should be resisted. Second, wherever possible, policy evaluation should be used to
reveal more information about the operation of the regional economy. That is to say,
evaluation in the future should focus more on understanding spatial interaction and less
on monitoring policy provision. Third, evaluation should be regarded not as an abstract
procedure but part of a process through which policy choice is made. As such, the
evaluation outcomes can have important implications for the interests of individuals and
groups. In this setting, issues of asymmetric information are important. These must be
recognised and the implications for the efficiency of evaluation understood. Finally,
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evaluation is part of the democratic process. As such it is dangerous for the government
to dominate the evaluation agenda.
In future, we would expect the evaluation of regional policy to be much more
challenging. First, current policy innovations are motivated by novel theories that are
likely to be more difficult to test. Traditional regional policy instruments are based
around very basic economic theory. Automatic factor subsidies applied to a range of
industries reduce unit costs, increasing regional competitiveness and output but lead to
the substitution of the unsubsidised inputs by the subsidised ones. However, discretionary
aid and schemes aimed to improve company dynamic efficiency through the generation
of positive spill-over effects are less easily conceptualised and tested. Second, the data
requirements for policy evaluation in the future will be more demanding yet the
availability of time series of reliable regional data is very limited. Third, the devolution
and delegation of powers of regional policymaking and delivery to multiple assemblies
and agencies will almost certainly increase the problems of asymmetric information.
Finally, although there is a rhetorical commitment to evidence-based policy, the present
emphasis on selling the governments policies to the electorate seems to be accompanied
by a low tolerance for alternative perspectives. 
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Footnotes
                                                          
1
 Problems of bounded rationality and asymmetric information seriously limit the scope
and desirability of joined-up policy making (Tirole, 1994).
2
 Where equation (1) is not differentiable a comparable, but less compact, relationship
can be produced which recognises possible discontinuities in the function represented by
equation (1).
3
 Policies will, in general, produce a stream of impacts over time. Therefore part of the
Social Welfare Function involves identifying the appropriate time discount rates, attitude
to risk, etc..
4
 Balls (2002) seems to equate plans to devolve and delegate regional policy with the
decision to delegate monetary policy in the UK to the MPC. In a future paper we intend
to contrast more thoroughly the operation of devolved regional policy as against the
operation of the MPC.
5
 In fact because the government has delegated policy in order to deal with the time
inconsistency problem, for the operation of the MPC it is important that appraisal and
implementation are open.
6
 This is as part of the Public Service Agreements to HM Treasury, the Department of
Trade and Industry and the Department of the Deputy Prime Minister. Also the
Department for Work and Pensions has, as part of its Public Service Agreement, agreed
to increase the employment rates of  the 30 local authority districts with the poorest
initial labour market position, and significantly reduce the difference between their
employment rates and the overall rate (HM Treasury, 2002, p. 31).
7
 In this paper we use the terms citizens and the electorate as synonyms.
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8
 We conjecture that this problem will become more prominent for regional policy with
the move towards more geographically devolved economic policy making. Essentially, as
suggested in Section 7, regions will have individual, conflicting, SWFs.
9
 This list is taken to be indicative and is in no sense exhaustive.
10
 For example, Taylor (2002) argues that one fundamental question for UK regional
policy evaluation that remains to be determined is the impact of regional policy on non-
assisted areas.
11
 This is independent of the fact that regional policy generates supply-side changes and
therefore if effective could change the natural rate of unemployment.
12
 For example, it might be that Locate in Scotland was effective in attracting Foreign
Direct Investment because the agency signalled a long-term commitment by Scottish
Enterprise and the Scottish Office to aid incoming firms.
